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Abstract. The Web is replete with tutorial-style content on how to
accomplish programming tasks. Unfortunately, even top-ranked tutori-
als suffer from severe security vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting
(XSS), and SQL injection (SQLi). Assuming that these tutorials influ-
ence real-world software development, we hypothesize that code snippets
from popular tutorials can be used to bootstrap vulnerability discovery at
scale. To validate our hypothesis, we propose a semi-automated approach
to find recurring vulnerabilities starting from a handful of top-ranked tu-
torials that contain vulnerable code snippets. We evaluate our approach
by performing an analysis of tens of thousands of open-source web ap-
plications to check if vulnerabilities originating in the selected tutorials
recur. Our analysis framework has been running on a standard PC, an-
alyzed 64,415 PHP codebases hosted on GitHub thus far, and found a
total of 117 vulnerabilities that have a strong syntactic similarity to vul-
nerable code snippets present in popular tutorials. In addition to shed-
ding light on the anecdotal belief that programmers reuse web tutorial
code in an ad hoc manner, our study finds disconcerting evidence of in-
sufficiently reviewed tutorials compromising the security of open-source
projects. Moreover, our findings testify to the feasibility of large-scale
vulnerability discovery using poorly written tutorials as a starting point.
1 Introduction
Programming aids such as web tutorials and Q&A websites are popular with
novice and expert programmers alike. To what extent, and how these aids in-
fluence the quality of real-world software remains an open question. On the one
hand, popular Q&A websites, such as stackoverflow.com, have an in-built rep-
utation system where correct advice gets up-voted through a consensus. Hence,
a common expectation is that community-driven websites weed out bad coding
suggestions. On the other hand, the Web is replete with tutorial-style webpages
that simply present curated snippets of code that accomplish a task. Most tuto-
rials omit a discussion about API quirks or the security-impact a code snippet
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Fig. 1. Workflow for finding recurring vulnerabilities.
might have. It is not surprising, therefore, that the presented code snippets suffer
from basic security vulnerabilities.
The connection between tutorials and vulnerabilities in real-world code is
largely unknown. Although previous studies [9, 16, 29, 36] have shown that
copy-pasted code can lead to recurring vulnerabilities, these studies have only
considered instances of copy-pasted code within a codebase. We seek to gen-
eralize this result by asserting that, like code snippets originating in the same
codebase, popular programming resources on the Web constitute a major source
of documentation that is regularly consulted by developers and often introduces
vulnerabilities into software.
Based on our assertion, we hypothesize that vulnerability discovery can be
seeded by code snippets such as those found in top-ranked tutorials. Viewed
from an adversarial standpoint, we present a novel approach for bootstrapping
vulnerability discovery at scale. Our main intuition is that recurring vulnera-
bilities can be found by recognizing, and subsequently looking for patterns in
code that correspond to the original vulnerability. We refer to instances of these
patterns as code analogues throughout the rest of the paper. Our expectation is
that if such a pattern recurs, so will the corresponding vulnerability. To identify
code analogues, we automatically generate graph traversals, which can be used
to mine code for these analogues using graph databases. Each graph traversal
is derived from normalized fragments of a code snippet’s abstract syntax tree
(AST), augmented with data-flow information. These graph traversals thus ex-
press syntactic properties of the original tutorial code.
Our workflow for finding recurring vulnerabilities consists of two steps. First,
we automatically translate vulnerable code snippets into graph traversals, which
concretize our expectations of code that constitutes an analogue. Second, we
serialize a codebase under analysis into a graph database and employ the auto-
matically generated traversals to search the database for analogue occurrences.
As a result, we obtain a set of locations in application source code that bear a
strong syntactic resemblance to vulnerable code snippets.
An empirical evaluation of our approach, on a data set of 64,415 web ap-
plications, shows that an adversary with access to a standard PC and a DSL
broadband connection can leverage our techniques to efficiently discover recur-
ring vulnerabilities in web application code (Section 3). Although AST is a fun-
damental construct for any programming language, we prototype our analysis
framework for analyzing applications written in PHP, the most widely deployed
server side scripting language to date [33]. Our analysis framework accepts vul-
nerable (tutorial) code snippets as input, and returns its analogues in a target
PHP codebase. Since our analysis can not guarantee that the returned ana-
logues are also vulnerable, we manually review them. Manual review has also
been useful in teasing out the connection insecure tutorials and web application
vulnerabilities. Thanks to our framework, we have uncovered over 100 vulner-
abilities in web application code that bear a strong resemblance to vulnerable
code patterns found in popular tutorials. More alarmingly, we have confirmed
that 8 instances of a SQLi vulnerability present in different web applications are
an outcome of code copied from a single vulnerable tutorial. Our results indicate
that there is a substantial, if not causal, link between insecure tutorials and web
application vulnerabilities.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
– We present a novel approach for bootstrapping large-scale vulnerability dis-
covery, namely, leveraging flawed tutorial code to seed vulnerability search in
application code. We evaluate this approach using a proof-of-concept frame-
work that finds recurring vulnerabilities in PHP application code hosted on
GitHub.
– We propose a computationally efficient method to search for recurring vul-
nerabilities. We translate vulnerable snippets of code into graph traversals
to identify code analogues in a program abstraction.
– We show that large-scale vulnerability scanning of publicly available open-
source repositories is feasible, even with limited resources such as a standard
PC and a broadband DSL connection.
– Finally, our results give credence to the widely known anecdote that pro-
grammers copy and paste code from vulnerable tutorials. Our case study,
involving 64,415 PHP projects hosted on GitHub, indicates that such ad
hoc code re-use may endanger the security of software throughout the open-
source landscape.
Our tools GithubSpider, and CADetector are available at https://github.
com/tommiu/GithubSpider and https://github.com/tommiu/ccdetection
respectively.
2 Methodology
In this study, we take on an attacker’s perspective and design our method such
that it allows for semi-automated discovery of recurring vulnerabilities without
requiring special access to a hosting platform or considerable computational re-
sources. Figure 1 illustrates our workflow, that we briefly describe in the following
paragraphs.
1. Derivation of templates from tutorials. We extract templates from
vulnerable code snippets contained in tutorials. These templates represent
syntactical properties of the vulnerable code as well as information about
data flow (Section 2.1).
2. Generating traversals from templates. We leverage templates to auto-
matically generate traversals for a graph-based code mining system. Graph
traversals enable us to scan large amounts of code for analogues of these
vulnerable snippets in a computationally efficient manner (Section 2.2).
3. Spidering code repositories. We automatically collect a large data set
of open-source code bases from a code hosting site, choosing GitHub as a
representative case study (Section 2.3).
4. Mining for vulnerabilities. Leveraging our analysis framework, we auto-
matically mine the code of our data set for instances of vulnerable tutorial
snippets. We manually cross-check if matches returned by our analysis plat-
form constitute vulnerabilities (Section 2.4).
In the remainder of this section, we describe each of these steps in greater detail
providing background information where necessary.
2.1 Derivation of Templates from Tutorials
Exact copies of vulnerable code snippets can be found using string matching
utilities such as the standard UNIX tool grep. However, as programmers copy
and paste code from tutorials, they are likely to adapt it slightly, for example,
by changing the names of variables. Therefore this na¨ıve approach fails in all but
the most simple cases. To account for slight modifications, we require a method
that is robust enough to identify sequences of statements similar to those found
in the tutorial in terms of the operations they carry out on their input variables.
We refer to these re-occurrences of tutorial code as code analogues, or simply
analogues.
An elegant approach to address this problem is to extract intermediate graph
representations from code that represent syntax and data flow, and formulate
syntactical and data flow properties of the code snippet in terms of traversals
in these graphs [see 13, 30, 35]. These traversals are formulated such that they
succeed when the code matches, and fail when it does not. Although these graph
traversals can be formulated manually, in this work, we devise a two-step proce-
dure to automatically generate them from vulnerable snippets of code, making
it possible to directly search for these snippets without additional manual work.
The first step of our procedure is to generate a template that encodes syntax
and data flow of the code snippet that we attempt to scan for. To illustrate
this process, we consider the vulnerable code snippet shown in Figure 2 taken
from a popular PHP tutorial. The code contains one SQLi, and one stored XSS
vulnerability. The SQLi vulnerability occurs on line 6 as the attacker-controlled
POST-variable $title is used in the construction of an SQL query without first
undergoing sanitization. The XSS vulnerability can be triggered on line 11, and
12 where databases rows are inserted into the document without escaping.
Two queries can be generated from the code snippet shown in Figure 2:
one to identify instances of the SQLi vulnerability, and another for the XSS
1 <?php
2 include "db.php";
3
4 $title=$_POST["title"];
5 $result=mysql_query("SELECT * FROM wp_posts where;
6 post_title like ’%$title%’ and post_status=’publish’");
7 $found=mysql_num_rows($result);
8
9 if($found>0){
10 while($row=mysql_fetch_array($result)){
11 echo "<li>$row[post_title]</br>
12 <a href=$row[guid]>$row[guid]</a></li>";
13 }
14 }else{
15 echo "<li>No Tutorial Found<li>";
16 }
17 // ajax search
18 ?>
Fig. 2. Identified vulnerable tutorial, allowing for SQLi (line 6), and XSS (line 11-12).
vulnerability. In the following walk-through, we focus on the SQLi vulnerability,
as highlighted in Figure 2.
We proceed to generate an AST of the vulnerable code snippet, a standard
tree-representation of program syntax. ASTs provide a hierarchical decomposi-
tion of code into its language elements. As an example, Figure 3(a) shows the
abstract syntax tree for the SQLi vulnerability. In this tree, leaf nodes corre-
spond to identifiers (e.g., $title), API symbols (e.g., mysql ...), or literals (e.g.,
SELECT), and inner nodes represent operations such as assignments, function calls,
or array indexing operations.
To derive a template from an AST, we replace all variables and literals by
wildcard symbols and introduce edges between nodes representing the same vari-
able. The template thus abstracts from concrete variable names and strings,
while preserving data flow between variables. Figure 3(b) shows the correspond-
ing template for our running example. As indicated by the data flow edges, the
template enforces that there is a match if and only if the variable occurring
on the left-hand side of the assignment in the first statement, and the variable
appearing as an argument in a function call in the next statement are the same.
An assignment to one variable, followed by the use of a different variable in a
function call does not trigger a match, because there is no data flow between
them.
With templates for code snippets at hand, we are now ready to generate
graph traversals that allow code to be mined for instances (analogues) of these
snippets.
2.2 Generation of Traversals from Templates
Upon successful generation of a template for a vulnerable code snippet, we trans-
form the template into a corresponding graph traversal. Although in principle,
graph traversals can be formulated in any programming language, the query
ASSIGN
$title DIM
"title"$_POST
ASSIGN
$result CALL
mysql_..
"... ..."
ASSIGN
$found CALL
mysql_..
AST
LIST $result
$title
(a) Abstract Syntax Tree.
ASSIGN
* DIM
*$_POST
ASSIGN
* CALL
mysql_..
* *
ASSIGN
* CALL
mysql_..
AST
LIST *
*
(b) Derived Template.
Fig. 3. Abstract syntax tree and derived template for the example in Figure 2.
language Gremlin [7] is specifically designed for this purpose. Moreover, traver-
sals formulated in Gremlin can be executed on any graph database system that
supports the Blueprints standard [6], a compatibility layer for graph databases
similar to JDBC for relational databases.
For a given template, we generate a traversal that identifies ASTs with (1) the
same node types, (2) in the same order, and (3) nested in the same way. Moreover,
the traversal succeeds only if data flow between statements is in correspondence
with the data-flow edges of the template.
In essence, the AST structure is encoded by formulating chains of filter op-
erations that succeed only if the desired node types can be matched. To account
for data flow, the names of variables are stored as the AST is traversed, and
filtering is performed to ensure that the correct variable names occur through-
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for translating templates into graph traversals.
1: function traversal(template)
2: t = ∅
3: for each child of template do
4: t += convertNode(child)
5: t += prepareNextSubtree()
return t
6:
7: function convertNode(child)
8: t = ∅
9: . Ensure correct node-type
10: t+= filter{ ”node.type == child.type” }
11: if node.type == ”VAR” then
12: if variable with name has been used before then
13: t += filter { ”this node’s name == name” }
14: else
15: t += sideEffect { Remember the variable }
16: for each child node of child do
17: t += convertNode(child node)
return t
18:
19: function prepareNextSubtree
20: return { traverse next child }
out the tree. Algorithm 1 describes this process in detail. Each child node of the
template is converted into a traversal via the recursive function ConvertNode,
and prepareNode adds code to traverse to the next child node.
As an example, Figure 4 shows the traversal generated by this procedure for
the vulnerable code snippet in Figure 2. For all nodes in the AST, the traversal
attempts to match the left subtree, the subtree in the middle, and the right
subtree starting at lines 3, 20, and 37 respectively. Subtrees are matched by
applying chains of filter expressions. For instance, to match the left-most subtree
consisting of an assignment with a variable as a child node, the traversal first
attempts to match an assignment, and, on success, determines whether the child
node is a variable node using a subsequent filter (see lines 4 and 5). Finally,
lightweight data-flow tracking is implemented by storing the names of variables
as they are first encountered (e.g., on line 8), and filtering based on these names
(e.g., line 33).
The generated traversals implement a computationally efficient code ana-
logue detection. For classic code clone detection tools, the comparison of every
subtree of a given AST of N nodes with every subtree of the same AST costs
O(N3) and can become O(N4) when also comparing sequences of trees. Since
empirically, a large software system of M lines of code has N = 10M AST nodes,
this AST-based approach suffers a hard scaling problem. There is a solution to
this runtime cost, which involves comparing hashes of AST subtrees instead of
1 g.V.sideEffect{ childnumber = 0 }
2
3 // Left subtree
4 .filter{ isType(it, "ASSIGN") }
5 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(0), "VAR") }
6
7 // Remember variable "title"
8 .sideEffect{ _title = it.ithChildren(0).varToName().next() }
9 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1), "DIM") }
10 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1).ithChildren(0), "VAR") }
11 .sideEffect{ childnumber = it.childnum }
12 .sideEffect{ childnumber = childnumber + 1 }
13
14 .parents().children().filter{ it.childnum == childnumber }
15
16 // Subtree in the middle
17 .filter{ isType(it, "ASSIGN") }
18 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(0), "VAR") }
19
20 // Remember variable "result"
21 .sideEffect{ _result = it.ithChildren(0).varToName().next() }
22 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1), "CALL") }
23 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1)
24 .ithChildren(0), "NAME") }
25 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1)
26 .ithChildren(1), "ARG_LIST") }
27 ...
28
29 .sideEffect{ childnumber = it.childnum }
30 .sideEffect{ childnumber = childnumber + 1 }
31
32 // Right subtree
33 .parents().children()
34 .filter{ it.childnum == childnumber }
35 .filter{ isType(it, "ASSIGN") }
36 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(0), "VAR") }
37
38 // Remember variable "found"
39 .sideEffect{ _found = it.ithChildren(0).varToName().next() }
40 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1), "CALL") }
41 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1).ithChildren(0), "NAME") }
42 .filter{ isType(it.ithChildren(1)
43 .ithChildren(1), "ARG_LIST") }
44 ...
Fig. 4. Generated traversal for the code snippet in Figure 2.
the AST subtrees themselves. Then, the runtime becomes O(N) [see 3]. However,
hashing subtrees will not work with our approach.
In our approach, we are comparing a given source AST S of N nodes, ob-
tained from a tutorial, with a target AST T of M nodes, which is the code base
that should be scanned for code analogues of S. Therefore, N is much smaller
than M . For this approach, the runtime is much smaller. More formally, our
algorithm starts out with comparing the first node in N with every node in M ,
until it finds one that is equal. This costs O(M). Then, it will compare the other
nodes as well, until all nodes in S were matched successfully in T . Therefore,
when a code analogue is found, we did N comparisons to match it. For subtrees
that are not analogues of S, we do 1 to N − 1 comparisons. This cost is O(N).
In the worst case, this entails a full check that costs O(N) for every node in T .
Thus, the complexity of our approach is O(NM),or for cases where N  M
holds, O(M).
Our algorithm can benefit from knowledge about the depth of nodes. Let
d(x) denote the depth of a node x, then, comparisons beyond an AST depth of
d(T ) − d(S) + 1 can be safely avoided, given that nodes at the depth cannot
contain the AST S. However, we typically make use of small vulnerable code
snippets (N M), for which the saving in computational cost is marginal.
Translation of tutorial templates into graph traversals provides us a means
to mine large amounts of open-source code for recurring vulnerabilities. Since we
assume that the attacker is not an insider (who can stealthily plug our analyses
into the back-end of a hosting platform), analysis impinges on the attacker being
able to download a project’s source code. To this end, we have implemented a
tool called GithubSpider to facilitate code crawling at scale. In the next section,
we briefly discuss its design and implementation.
2.3 Spidering Code Repositories
We make a conservative estimate of computing resources that an attacker has at
his/her disposal. We assume that an attacker has access to a modest computing
device such as a standard PC, and a DSL broadband connection. Our threat
model lowers the barrier to entry for performing vulnerability discovery at scale.
Additionally, we assume that the attacker makes every effort to be stealthy. In
the context of code spidering, this implies that rate limits imposed by a hosting
service cannot be abused. Thus, we are constrained to spider at a modest speed.
The constraints that we impose on the attacker make our tooling and analysis
operate in a real-world setting. Understanding whether an attacker, in spite of
these constraints, can use our techniques to find vulnerabilities in open-source
code is part of our research question.
Although multiple code hosting platforms provide APIs that could be used
for spidering, we focus on GitHub in our case study. GitHub is the most popular
open-source collaboration platform, hosting approximately 10.3 million develop-
ers, and over 25 million projects [10]. In addition to code, GitHub maintains
meta-data such as a project’s language, creation time, popularity (stars and
forks), and total code size.
Our spidering tool, GithubSpider, uses GitHub’s REST API to obtain project
meta-data for a large number of projects. GithubSpider is designed to be general
purpose: It obtains project meta-data and applies user-defined filters to them,
providing the flexibility required to spider code repository classes of interest.
Thus, GithubSpider can be leveraged towards analysis of a different family of
codebases, say C/C++ code. We leverage GithubSpider to crawl projects written
in the PHP language. Additionally, we filter projects based on their popularity.
We gauge a project’s popularity by the number of stars5 it has received. After
narrowing down projects of interest, we leverage GitHubspider to clone (down-
load) projects and their revision history (see Section 3.3).
5 A GitHub user can express interest in a repository by starring it.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to find code analogues using graph traversals.
1: procedure MineCode(repositories, queries)
2: for each repository in respositories do
3: create ASTs for repository
4: import ASTs into graph database and start server
5: for each query in queries do
6: run query against database server
7: save statistical data
8: save code clone data
9: stop graph database server
2.4 Mining for Vulnerabilities
Finally, we automatically mine the downloaded code repositories using the
traversals generated from vulnerable code snippets (see Section 2.2). We achieve
this by importing the code into the code-mining platform Joern [35]. Joern first
parses source files to generate ASTs, and subsequently imports the ASTs into
a Neo4j graph database, which allows us to efficiently execute graph traversals
and collect statistical data about our analysis.
Scanning the large number of projects obtained from our spider in an accept-
able time frame is challenging task, as graph matching needs to be performed
on all ASTs of all retrieved code bases. Fortunately, projects can be processed
independently, and therefore, we can distribute scanning across several processes
running in parallel by splitting spidered repositories into groups. This task can
also be carried out in a distributed setting.
For a given set of queries and a group of repositories, Algorithm 2 summarizes
the scanning process that we carry out. For each repository, the algorithm creates
ASTs for each of its source files and imports them into the graph database. The
graph database server is subsequently started, each query is executed against the
databases, and statistical data such as query execution time is collected. Upon
running all queries on a project, the graph database server is stopped.
We have implemented the presented algorithm in a tool, that we call CADe-
tector, short for code analogue detector. CADetector takes automatically gen-
erated queries (Gremlin traversals), and a PHP project for analysis as input,
and returns matching code as output. Code analogues are presented to a human
analyst for review. In the next section, we present our evaluation methodology
and results.
3 Evaluation
Our evaluation follows a two-step process. First, we select a handful of vulner-
able code snippets, obtained from top-ranked PHP tutorials, to seed our study.
Second, if we find a match for a vulnerable snippet in our data set as a result
of our analysis, we flag it for manual review. Based on this two-step process,
we have performed extensive evaluation of our analysis framework. Our analysis
data set consists of 64,415 PHP codebases that have been downloaded using
GitHubSpider. To gauge its feasibility, we have run our analysis against the top
10 PHP codebases on GitHub, in addition to the codebases in our data set. The
following paragraphs describe how seeds were obtained and queries generated
(Section 3.1), the nature of the analysis data set (3.3), and our analysis results
(3.4).
3.1 Identification of Vulnerable Tutorials
To identify widely read tutorials, we query the Google search engine using the
following set of terms.
"mysql tutorial"
"php database user"
"php mysql user query"
"php search form"
"php ajax search tutorial"
"javascript echo user input"
For each of these search terms, we manually review the first five results re-
turned by the search engine. We evaluate each of the tutorials for SQLi and
XSS vulnerabilities by following established secure programming guidelines by
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), namely, the guide on
Reviewing Code for SQL Injection [14], and the Cross Site Scripting Prevention
Cheat Sheat [28]. Among the top five results (30 in total), we find 9 tutorials that
contain vulnerable code: 6 tutorials with SQLi, and 3 tutorials with XSS. A snip-
pet from a representative tutorial containing both SQLi and XSS vulnerabilities
is shown in Figure 2.
3.2 Query Generation
We expect copy-pasted code from vulnerable tutorials to result in recur-
ring vulnerabilities in application code. A more subtle manner in which recur-
ring vulnerabilities may manifest themselves is when developers follow the same
(vulnerable) programming idiom(s) presented by a tutorial. To cater to both
possibilities, we generate queries using an exact replica of code present in a tu-
torial (normal query), and a slice of the tutorial code containing the vulnerability
(strict query). A strict query abstracts only the vulnerable slice of code, whereas
a normal query abstracts the entire tutorial. We use strict queries to identify
known vulnerable patterns in web applications, and normal queries to identify
code analogues of tutorial code. Figure 5 illustrates the difference between code
snippets used for generating normal, and strict queries. Entire tutorial code is
shown in the listing with the vulnerable slice highlighted in red. Lines 4–6 of the
tutorial contain a classic SQLi vulnerability: Unsanitized user-input from a POST
variable is used in a MySQL query. The vulnerable slice contains only these lines,
which represents the minimal working snippet containing the vulnerability.
1 <?php
2 // Check for existing user with the new id
3
4 $sql = "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM user WHERE
5 userid = ’$_POST[newid]’";
6 $result = mysql_query($sql);
7 if (!$result) {
8 error(’A database error occurred in
9 processing your submission.\nIf this
10 error persists, please contact
11 you<at>example.com.’);
12 }
13 if (mysql_result($result,0,0)>0) {
14 error(’A user already exists with your chosen
15 userid.\n. Please try another.’);
16 }
17 ?>
Fig. 5. Vulnerable code snippet from tutorial, containing a SQL injection vulnerability
between lines 4–6 (slice).
3.3 Analysis Data-set
We leverage GitHub to obtain a large data set of web applications for analysis.
GitHub hosts over 25 million projects written in several programming languages.
Thus, we filter content (PHP projects) that is relevant to us. Our crawler in-
spects project metadata (accessible via REST API) to perform the filtering.
GihubSpider, our code crawler implementation, has filtered through a total of
462,069 PHP repositories on GitHub. Of these, we have downloaded a total of
64,415 PHP codebases for analysis. These codebases comprise our analysis data
set.
We divide our data set into three groups by popularity. We quantify the
popularity of a codebase by the number of times it has been starred by users on
GitHub. Our classification results in the following data set partitions:
1. Barely known projects (Not popular). 42,064 projects that are starred
at most three times and have a total file size of less than 3 MB.
2. Projects known by several people (Popular). 16,037 projects that are
starred at least four times, but at most nine times, and have a total file size
of less than 3 MB.
3. Popular projects (Very popular). 6,314 projects that are starred at least
ten times and have a total file size of less than 3 MB.
GitHub imposes a rate limit of 5000 API requests per authenticated user per
hour. The imposed rate limit proved to be the main bottleneck in downloading
repositories. Although using multiple authenticated accounts for crawling is a
simple workaround for removing the bottleneck, we stayed clear of it.
3.4 Analysis Results
We used auto-generated graph traversals (queries) to mine for analogues in our
analysis data set. Discovered analogues were manually reviewed, and vulnerable
Data set Size Code
ana-
logues
Vulnerabilities
(percentage)
Not popular 42,064 269 80 (29.74%)
Popular 16,037 528 35 (6.63%)
Very popular 6,314 23 2 (8.7%)
Total 64,415 820 117 (14.27%)
Table 1. Analysis summary for codebases in our data set. In total, 820 code analogues
were found which included 117 recurring vulnerabilities. The table shows a break down
of our findings in each data set partition.
analogues identified. Table 1 shows an overview of the analogues, and vulnerabili-
ties discovered by our analyses. With under two dozen graph traversals generated
from a handful of vulnerable tutorials, we obtained 820 code analogues of which
117 were found to be vulnerable. We found that string normalization in the AST
resulted in non-exact matches. For instance, a query generated from the code
snippet $var = $ GET[’var’] matched not only its replica but also a seemingly
benign snippet such as $var = $value[’id’]. Thus, matches returned by the
traversals had to be manually validated. In spite of string normalization, we
found that automatically generated queries result in interesting corner cases.
Among non popular codebases, roughly 1 out of 3 code analogues is vulnerable,
and on average 1 out of 7 analogues is vulnerable across the entire data set.
Analogues are localized to a small portion of application code, which facilitates
manual review of all candidates returned by our analyzer.
Newly discovered vulnerabilities We manually verified a total of 117 vulnera-
bilities in our data set. Of these, 8 vulnerabilities were replicas of code from a
popular SQL tutorial that we found on the first Google results page. Although
all of the 8 vulnerabilities were found among non popular code repositories, the
finding shows that ad-hoc code reuse is a reality. We are in the process of no-
tifying the tutorial authors about our findings. Our hope is that the presented
vulnerabilities are fixed in a timely manner, so that developers borrowing code
from these tutorials in the future will not inherit the same vulnerabilities in their
code.
80% of the discovered vulnerabilities were SQLi vulnerabilities, and the rest
were XSS, and path-traversal vulnerabilities. As shown in Table 1, the proportion
of vulnerable codebases is higher among low popularity codebases, compared
to medium and high popularity codebases. During manual review, we found a
plausible explanation for this disparity in vulnerability density: PHP applications
in the moderate and high popularity categories make consistent use of newer,
and more secure, MySQL APIs in PHP which are not vulnerable to classic (first-
order) SQLi attacks. We found that use of the PDO MySQL interface [31], and
the MySQLi extension [32] was widespread among these codebases.
1 // SQL injection vulnerability
2 $questionQuery = "SELECT * FROM Questions
3 WHERE AssnID=’$_GET[AssnID]’";
4 $questionResult = mysql_query($questionQuery);
1 // Path-traversal vulnerability
2 $filename = "signatures/{$_GET[’id’]}.png";
3 $handle = fopen($filename, "r");
1 // Potential SQL injection vulnerability
2 $oldBusSeats = "SELECT businessseats FROM flight
3 WHERE flightNo = $flight[0]";
4 $busseats = mysql_query($oldBusSeats);
Fig. 6. The figure shows three analogues returned by CADetector that match the
traversal generated for the vulnerable slice in Figure 5. Although we expected to
find only SQLi vulnerabilities, we also uncovered a path-traversal vulnerability that
matched our query template.
3.5 Discussion
Manual review of the code analogues and vulnerabilities returned by our
analysis framework suggests that, graph traversals are very good at eliciting
vulnerable snippets in a large amount of code. Firstly, our approach ensures that
the code analogues that we find are small snippets of code, typically spanning
under 10 lines of code in our dataset. Figure 6 shows three code analogues
returned by CADetector for a query originating from the vulnerable code snippet
in Figure 5. All three analogues span two lines of code and can be quickly assessed
by a human analyst.
Secondly, we find that the abstraction that we choose (AST augmented with
data-flow information) is robust. For example, we discovered a path-traversal
vulnerability in the process of mining a codebase using a SQLi query. Indeed,
both vulnerabilities share the same syntactic structure of code: A tainted PHP
variable is used in a security-sensitive PHP function call (mysql query and fopen).
However, since our abstraction does not convey information about taintedness
of data, our analysis returns analogues where vulnerabilities may need to be
manually verified. The third analogue shown in Figure 6 serves as a demon-
strative example. The analogue contains a potential SQLi vulnerability. It is
vulnerable if the PHP variable $flight reads from a tainted variable (say, an
attacker-controlled $ POST variable). This needs to be manually verified in our
setup.
Analysis runtime Our timing measurements showed that our analysis is fast for
even relatively large codebases. For the top 10 PHP code repositories on GitHub,
CADetector analysis runtime varies between 19 seconds (for the laravel project,
777 lines of code) and 53 minutes (for symfony, 209 thousand lines of code). Our
evaluations suggest that CADetector is a fast analogue detector for codebases
with hundreds of thousands of lines of code and above.
4 Related Work
Our work touches upon two distinct problems: finding similar code, and flagging
vulnerabilities in source code. In the following, we contextualize our work in
both domains.
Code clone detection Despite modern software design processes and state of the
art programming environments, real-world software development accommodates
ad-hoc code re-use. In their seminal work on code clone detection, Baxter et
al. [3], citing earlier work [1, 25], state that 5-10% of source code is duplicated
in large software projects. The initial motivation for code clone detection was
that ridding software of seemingly redundant code might achieve a performance
gain. Thus, traditional code clone detection tools seek code replicas in a single
codebase, or a set of codebases with the same provenance. This has guided
the design of several code clone detection tools [2–5, 8, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 21–
24, 26, 27].
Recent research [16, 29] has shown that code clones pose a more serious
threat: Vulnerabilities in cloned code get propagated but their fixes do not. Re-
DeBug [16] flags unpatched code clones by finding replicas of a known vulnerable
snippet in an OS distribution. Like earlier proposals on code clone detection, Re-
DeBug flags clones within codebases of similar provenance, because of which it
may look for exact matches. In contrast, we cannot always expect to find bor-
rowed code from an external source as is: Developers typically adapt tutorial
code for their own end. This subtle difference precludes the use of hashing func-
tions to measure similarity of code in our work. Instead, our queries attempt to
recognize the structure of vulnerable code.
Yamaguchi et al. [36] propose a machine-learning based method for extrapo-
lating (i.e., finding other instances of) known vulnerable code patterns that are
manually specified. Our work is closer to theirs in that we employ structural
code fragments (such as AST fragments) to drive the search for vulnerabilities.
Having said that, a notable difference is that Yamaguchi et al. perform com-
putations on a code abstraction (specifically, a vector space). In our work, the
query for a similar code snippet is concretized in the form of graph traversals.
Moreover, we automatically generate vulnerability patterns from code snippets.
Vulnerability discovery Since we use static program analysis in discovering vul-
nerabilities, we shall restrict our discussion to prior work in this domain. The
dynamic nature of web programming languages, such as PHP and JavaScript,
has made static analysis of web applications a challenging task. Researchers
have approached vulnerability discovery in PHP code as a static taint analysis
problem: Detect the flow of untrusted user input into a security sensitive sink.
Pixy [19] is a static analysis tool that flags XSS, and SQLi vulnerabilities in
PHP codebases. In the same vein as Pixy, Xie et al. [34] present a summary-
based static analysis algorithm to discover security vulnerabilities in PHP code.
Our proposal is not another vulnerability scanner for PHP code. Rather, our
techniques provide a means to draw inferences about unsafe coding practices
among web application developers. Considering that web applications are ulti-
mately user-facing programs that handle sensitive data, our study is timely.
5 Limitations and Future Work
A limitation of our study is that our prototype restricts the evaluation scope
of recurring vulnerability detection to PHP application code; that is, we cannot
say that programmers employing other languages are similarly prone to copy-
ing from tutorials. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to open-source code, and
thus, the possibility exists that the practice of copying from tutorials is par-
ticularly prevalent in the open-source world and less common in closed-source
environments. Exploring these questions is left for future work.
For the detection of code analogues, we employ an approach that allows
the names of identifiers to be changed, but is otherwise strict about the code
it matches. For example, if additional statements are introduced in between
statements of a seed, we do not detect the corresponding code as a clone. This
is a deliberate design choice. Although it may result in the discovery of fewer
tutorials, the identified code is more similar to that contained in the tutorial,
and therefore, more likely to have been copied from it.
Our approach—formulating graph traversal queries from code snippets, and
issuing these queries in a code mining system—is generic enough to be decoupled
from the specifics of a programming language. Thus, our analysis techniques
can be incorporated into existing code analysis platforms such as Kythe [11],
Joern [35], and Frappe´ [12]. Systematically leveraging popular tutorial content
from the Web to seed vulnerability discovery is an avenue for future research.
For instance, portals such as Google Trends can be queried to obtain high-value
seeds for vulnerability discovery.
6 Conclusion
Developers routinely consult programming resources as software is written. Al-
though formal documentation such as language and API reference manuals pro-
vide detailed guidance, tutorials on the Web are as easily available and are more
succinct. The lure of quick actionable advice makes tutorials an appealing refer-
ence for developers. We find that tutorials are not only ubiquitous on the Web
but also very popular, consistently appearing in the first Google results page.
Several tutorials betray a lack of understanding of secure coding practices advo-
cated by well-regarded online communities such as OWASP. In our large-scale
case study, we find over 100 vulnerable code snippets in application code that are
syntactically similar, and in 8 instances identical, to tutorial code. These find-
ings corroborate our hypothesis that vulnerable tutorials can be used to seed
large-scale vulnerability discovery. They also suggest that there is a pressing
need for code audit of widely consumed tutorials, perhaps with as much rigor as
for production code.
We show that the syntactic structure of code can be used to infer similarities
between code snippets of different provenance. Because syntactic analysis is rel-
atively lightweight, it is fast enough to mine a large number of differently-sized
codebases for recurring vulnerabilities. Our large-scale study is a testament to
the efficiency of our proposal. This also means that there is low barrier to entry
for performing vulnerability discovery at scale. Even an adversary with access
to modest computing resources may be seen as direct threat to the security of
software in the large open-source landscape. Although our study provides a sin-
gle data point for an objective assessment of both our adversarial strategy and
the connection between tutorials and real-world software, there appears to be
promise in the applicability of our techniques to other application classes.
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